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Kupfer: Feminist Legal Thought

AUTONOMY AND COMMUNITY IN
FEMINIST LEGAL THOUGHT
SUSAN

G.

KUPFER*

In discussing the rights of woman, we are to
consider, first, what belongs to her as an
individual, in a world of her own, the arbiter
of her own destiny, ... on a solitary island ....
The strongest reason for giving... her the most
enlarged freedom of thought and action .. .is
the solitude and personal responsibility of
her own individual life.
-Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 1892 1
[W]omen have always had to wrestle with
the knowledge that individualism's prestigious models of authoritative subjectivity
have refused female identification. Feminism, as an ideology, took shape in the context of the great bourgeois and democratic
revolutionary tradition. It thus owes much
to the male-formulated ideology of individualism, as it does to the special experiences
of women who have been excluded from the
benefits of individualism.
-Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, 19912
In the hundred years between the statements of the two
Elizabeths, feminist legal thought3 has contributed, in an
... Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. Thanks to Dean Anthony
J. Pagano and Professor Judith McKelvey for their professional and personal support.
I'd also like to acknowledge the superb research assistance of Ghada N. Saliba and the
work of the students in my Jurisprudence seminars at Golden Gate. Sometimes I wonder who the teacher is.
1. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, The Solitude of Self, IN ELIZABETH CADY STANTON,
SUSAN B. ANTHONY WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 246 (Ellen C. DuBois ed., 1981).
2. ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, FEMINISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 225 (1991).
3. "Feminism is then the range of committed inquiry and activity dedicated
first, to describing women's subordination-exploring its nature and extent; dedicated second, to asking both how-through what mechanisms-and why-for what complex and interwoven reasons-women continue to occupy that position; and dedicated
third to change." Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of
Feminist Legal Thought, 3-4 BERK.WOMEN'S L.J. 1,2-3 (1988).
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explosion of scholarship, to the unpacking and understanding
of the dichotomies ofWoman/Man, Self/Other, Subject/Object,
Individual/Community. As an introduction to this issue of
the Women's Law Forum, I want to explore one particular
aspect of the discussion, which Duncan Kennedy has called the
"fundamental contradiction" of liberal thought: that "relations with others are both necessary to and incompatible with
our freedom. "4
Feminist scholarship, unlike critical theory, has not completely challenged the basic tenets of liberal ideology. While
the critical view has been to reject the individualism of liberal political theory in favor of structural arguments against the
legitimacy of state power,6 feminist scholarship has started from
a focus on the position or experience of women as socially gendered. Because historically women have been relegated to
the private sphere of home and family while subordinated to
men in the public sphere of work and politics,6 feminist analysis has developed critiques of both aspects of the dichotomy
of individual! community. In seeking to remedy gender
inequality, writers face a dilemma. The possibility of autonomy for individual women risks subscribing to liberal ideology,
with its known inequities; yet, the focus on community flirts
with reductionism, seeing women as only connected to others.
Robin West articulated the parallel development of the
opposition of critical theory to classic liberal thought in what.
she terms 'irretrievably masculine' jurisprudence and contrasted it to a jurisprudence based on the SUbjective experience
ofwomen. 1 Liberal theory seeks to protect the individual from
'annihilation' by oth~rs through the construct of legal rights;
rights establish boundaries, enforced through law, but have the
consequence, exposed by critical theory, of contributing to
alienation and frustrating a desire for connection. 8 The identical themes in feminist jurisprudence, which West calls "the
state of connection,"9 create different oppositions: cultural
feminism sees intimacy and connection as its main value and
4. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L.
REV. 205, 211-13 (1979).
5. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 9-10 (1987).
6. See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983);
Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105
HARV. L. REV. 1045. 1061-62 (1992).
7. Robin West. Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
8. 1d. at 4-12.
9. 1d. at 3.
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fears separation from others as its harm,IO while radical
feminism seeks to maximize the integrity of the individual
woman and views invasion or intrusion of the self (through commitment to children or others) as a primary obstacle to autonomy.ll
Recently public debate has focused on the extreme differences generated by conflicts in feminist ideology. 12 Within the
academy, splits between liberaP3, cuituraP4 and radicaP6 feminists demonstrate the strongly diversified approaches to the
problem while the critique of anti-essentialism has denied
the view that there can be one coherent voice for feminism. 16
Outside the ivory walls, the media continues to reinforce cultural stereotypes 'proving' the failure of the feminist vision.17
The epigraph from Elizabeth Fox-Genovese typifies one
aspect of the struggle: she argues that concentration by feminists on individualist notions of empowerment is misplaced
and that it is the surrender to the community which will result
in a bette,r life for women. IS Robin West would agree: although
she seems to understand the ideas of radical feminists supporting autonomy, she endorses an essentialist position for
women as they are defined and connected by the experience, or
capacity, for mothering. 19
In Part I, following a brief analysis of the critique of liberal
political theory, I argue that the theories of Fox-Genovese and
West deny the felt experience of women in their own struggle
to counteract the construct of gender; since women are "engendered" by social norms, they must first develop the subjective
experience of autonomy, in which they seek to understand the
inner direction of their authentic selves. Second, as I argue in
10. [d. at 13-28.
11. [d. at 29-36.
12. See, e.g., Jane Gallop, Marianne Hirsch, Nancy K. Miller, Criticizing Feminist
Criticism, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 349 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds.,
1990) (describing personal experiences with criticism); Martha L. Fineman, Challenging
Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L.
REV. 25 (1990) (lamenting the splintering caused by the debate over essentialism).
13. See infra text accompanying note 26.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 30-37
15. See infra text accompanying note 40.
16. See ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
17. Current examples include those detailed in SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH (1991).
18. Fox-GENOVESE, supra note 2, at 33-54.
19. West, supra note 7.
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Part II, the idea of community, much bandied about, is a concept which is ill-defined in most feminist thought. Further, the
prescription for women's place as part of a community generally ignores the experience of women who traditionally have
been subordinated by their defined roles within communities.
While this essay considers a range of written work about
feminism, there is no unified theory presented in the literature.
The innovation and energy of the work is based upon contextual expression of various women's experiences 20 and it is the
very point of subjective differences which is valued. This
might be characterized as a post-modernist view. 21 As Martha
Minow has explored in an extended work, the emphasis on and
discussion of difference holds the promise of a thoughtful
reconsideration of some central ideas of liberal theory: neutrality (unpacking the assumptions underlying a certain, objective norm by which we measure difference) and universality or
tolerance (valuing, not stigmatizing, the difference).22
Feminist theorizing starts from the reality of women's varied, contextual experience as a source for examining gender
inequality.23 While there may be no single voice that speaks for
Woman,24 gender oppression continues to be both central and
distinctive to inequality within our society. This does not minimize the vast inequities created by race, class or sexual preference but it does define a different slice of the social, economic
and legal framework. A survey of the literature demonstrates
its dazzling diversity:
Beginning in the late 1960's, the first wave of feminist legal
thought focused on eradicating the legal differences between the
genders. 26 The notion of formal equality culminated in the
20. For an elaboration of this idea, see Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman,
In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597 (1990).
21. Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Poststructuralist Feminist
Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129 (1987). Nancy Fraser & Linda J. Nicholson,
Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and
Postmodernism, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 19,35 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
22. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990).
23. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 lIARv. L. REV.
821 (1990).
24. SPELMAN, supra note 16, at 133-59.
25. For the taxonomies that follow, I have drawn on accounts by Patricia A. Cain,
Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 5-4 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (198990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803 (1990);
Dalton, supra note 3; Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV.
617 (1990).
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attempt to pass the second Equal Rights Amendment and in the
development of analyses examining unequal formal distinctions
in employment, educational opportunities, reproductive freedom, pregnancy leave, rape laws and so on. 28 These theorists
worked very much within the existing legal system, seeking to
use the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and governmental rulings to eliminate gender discrimination.
The strategy had its limitations after its first few successes. 27
But the next wave of feminist theorists rejected the idea of
formal gender equality in favor of recognizing and celebrating
the differences between the genders. 28 Some revere the connections that women have to others and to the community.29
They draw on psychological30 , ethicapt, and socioiogicaP2 scholarship to inform their theories. They have been dubbed the "difference voice" feminists, after Carol Gilligan's major work33 or
the "cultural feminists" in Robin West's analysis. 34 Legal
scholars have used the distinctive feminist perspective to
articulate a different vision of law practice35 and legal education38 , and to further the discussion and analysis of gender
26. Lucinda Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Henna Hill Kay, Models of
Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 39; Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the
Equal Treatment / Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985).
27. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95
YALE L.J. 1373, 1375 (1986).
28. Cain, Limits of Equality, supra note 25, at 835-38.
29. See West, supra note 7.
30. NANCY L. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978); JEAN BAKER
MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (1976); JULIET MITCHELL,
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM (1974).
31. Drucilla Cornell, probably more of a postmodernist than a cultural feminist,
nevertheless develops the idea of "femininity" in her ethical work. Drucilla Cornell,
Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291
(1985); Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 644 (1990).
32. E.g., Barrie Thorne, Children and Gender: Constructions of Difference in
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah Rhode ed., 1990).
33. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). Gilligan's work has been
extremely widely read and utilized. For a good critical commentary on her work, see
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the
Logic of the Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109, 120-30 (1991); Joan C. Williams,
Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 840 n.181 (1989).
34. West, supra note 7.
35. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, 1 BERK. WOMEN'S
L.J. 39 (1985).
36. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies
and Legal Education or -The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61
(1988).
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issues. 37 This second wave has generated two different critiques: one which deplores the debate over sameness/difference
as a useless, divisive conflict in feminist ideology,38 and the
other which fears the focus on difference will trivialize and
marginalize women's concerns. 39
Catharine MacKinnon is a radical feminist. 40 Her analysis,
based on Marxist theory of class dominance/subordination,
also focuses on difference between the sexes. She views gender as socially constructed and believes that men use the difference of sex to justify unequal power over the class of
women}! Where the cultural feminists might see difference
as a product of biological or psychological determination,
MacKinnon postulates that women are defined by men on the
basis of their sexuality. Women as a class are defined by men
according to their difference from men; this leads her to argue
for special protections for women under law to redress women's
subordination in the areas of sexual harassment, rape, and
pornography.42 MacKinnon reduces women to an essential
characteristic: their sexual "use and abuse by men. "43
Women of color, building on ideas generated by critical
race theory," also center their analysis on difference. However,
they use the fact of difference and the exploration of context to
argue against a unified theory of feminist thought. Instead,
they have advanced the thesis of intersectionality45 or antiessentialism. 46 They attack traditional feminist theory as privileging only certain (white, middle class, heterosexual) women
37. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38
J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Mary Joe Frug, Rereading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis
of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985); Martha Minow, Foreward:
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); Judith Resnik, On the Bias:
Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877
(1988); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
38. Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness / Difference Debate: A Post-Modern
Path Beyond Essentialism and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J., 296.
39. Rhode, supra note 25, at 618; Schroeder, supra note 33, at 120.
40. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
41. MACKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 40, 40-45.
42. MACKiNNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at Chapters 6 and 7.
43. MACKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 40, at 5.
44. See generally Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987).
45. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
46. Harris, supra note 16.
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while ignoring the concerns of the outsider47or the disadvantaged woman. They question whether there can or should be
a unitary vision of a feminist agenda. 48
More recently, a number of theorists have elaborated upon
frameworks from European intellectual theory to analyze
ender issues in the fields of literary theory,49 structuralism, 60
hermeneutics,Gl and post-modernism. 62 Post-modernism, generally, seeks to undermine the duality of normative discourse,
to refrain from seeing dichotomies of self/other, man/woman,
white/outsider, heterosexuallhomosexual, dichotomies which
not only define through contradiction (e.g. Woman is not Man63 )
but imply a hierarchical advantage of the dominant definer over
the other.64 Rather, these theorists seek to understand a more
central conception of the definition which takes aspects of
both parts of the duality, not quite as a synthesis, but as a recreation. 66
Lastly, relying on the centrality of women's subjective
experience to an explanation and critique of gender inequality, the unique contribution of feminist theory may well be in the
development of a methodology to explore gender differences"
and to articulate the particulars of the gendered experience. 57
The methodology has the potential of generating true transformation as it substitutes ways of recalling the experience of
women for society's presumptions about official neutrality
and universality toward difference." These methods include
the theory of 'positionality,'69 consciousness raising,eO use of
47. Id. at 584.
48. Id. at 585·90.

49. See, e.g., Jane Maslow Cohen, Feminism and Adaptive Heroinism: The
Paradigm of Portia as a Means of Introduction, 25 TuLSA L.J. 657 (1990).
50. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Room for Manoeuver: Toward a Theory of
Practice in Critical Legal Studies, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 64 (1989); Ashe, supra note 21.
51. Schroeder, supra note 33.
52. Ashe, supra note 21.
53. This insight is Simone DeBeauvoir's; SIMONE DEBEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX
(1952)
54. Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, The Uses of
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUDIES 33 (1988), paraphrasing
Jacques Derrida: "the interdependence is hierarchical with one term dominant or prior,
the opposite term subordinate and secondary." Id. at 37.
55.Id.
56. Bartlett, supra note 23.
57. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971 (1991)
(describing the use of narrative in feminist writing).
58. Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal Methods (Book Review), 16
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 373 (1991).
59. Bartlett, supra note 23, at 880·87.
60. MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at Chapter 5.
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narrative61 and practical reasoning or contextually situated
analysis. 62 Some have suggested that the new methods could
generate a different view of due legal process. 68
Because of the diversity in the ways that feminist theorists
understand and use the notion of difference, there is a risk that
feminist theory will be trivialized by others as incoherent. At
the core of the feminist struggle are the competing concerns of
relieving inequality based on gender for individual women
while appreciating the role of women within the community.
Feminist legal thought vacillates between supposedly irreconciliable visions of complete equality and autonomy for the
individual woman (liberal feminist thought) and primary identification of the woman with the needs of the community,
most often defined as her family, her commitment to children
and others (cultural feminist thought).
But, perhaps these may not be opposed dichotomies. 64 The
strength of women's experience may very well be impulses to
both: true equality through complete autonomy for every individual in society and full participation of the autonomous
individual within the community. There is no reason that
autonomous individuals cannot be joined by an interest or
goal in transformative imaginings of the possibilities of difference. 66
1.
A.

AUTONOMY IN FEMINIST THOUGHT
BACKGROUND: THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM

The radical views of critical legal studies, critical race theory and feminism reject the underpinnings ofliberallegalism.
Deborah Rhode puts it succinctly:
61. Abrams, supra note 57.
62. Minow & Spelman, supra note 20.
63. Cynthia Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J. OF LAw & FEMINISM 189
(1991).
64. "Ifrelationism seeks to reconcile the self and the other, while respecting the
otherness of the other, it may be intensely feminist." Schroeder, supra note 33, at 130.
65. Jennifer Nedelsky's vision of autonomy includes transformative aspects of
community. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and
Possibilities, 1 YALE J. OF LAw & FEMINISM 7 (1989); Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic
of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589,
603 (1986).
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[L]iberal theorists generally begin from the
premise that the state's central objective
lies in individuals' freedom to pursue their
own objectives to an extent consistent with
the same freedom for others. Implicit in
this vision are several assumptions about
the nature of individuals and the subjectivity of values. As conventionally presented,
the liberal state is composed of autonomous,
rational individuals .... yet, while capable of
full knowledge of their own preferences,
these liberal selves lack similar knowledge
of others. Accordingly, the good society
remains as neutral as possible about the
meaning of the good life. 66
Liberal legal thought protects the individual at the core of
its ideology in two specific ways: through respect for freedom
or autonomy and through the idea of equality or universal
treatment. The individual freely cedes power to the state
through the idea of the social contract, retaining the freedom
to live a life which is self-determined. Individualism is protected in liberal ideology through the idea of rights which provide a defense of individual perogatives against the threat
from the community or from government. But, as critics ofliberal ideology argue, the claims of liberalism to be "inclusive,
participatory and egalitarian" are false. 67 Further, reliance on
legal rights fosters selfish, atomistic, rational actors out to maximize their own goals, creating in the process a society which
is alienating. 6s While reliance on state power to enforce rights
subjects individuals to the indeterminate exercise of power by
state officials,69 it also privileges those who can take advantage
of the competitve struggle. The focus on universality in liberalism, the critics argue, sublates real, divisive existing
inequities of class, resources, race and such within the rhetoric
of theoretical equality. And, while equality is the ideal of
treating comparably situated individuals in the same way,
analysis of the realities of daily life demonstrates that the
true neutrality of the state toward outcomes succeeds only in
66. Rhode, supra note 25, at 627.
67. [d. at 628.

68. See Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights Consciousness and the Pact
of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984); KELMAN, supra note 5, at 63;
Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
69. Tushnet, supra note 68.
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advantaging those already privileged and marginalizing those
who are disadvantaged. 70
Feminists are uniquely positioned to continue and to add
to the critique of liberal legalism. "The personal is political"
has two dimensions: a political view of personhood demonstrates the deeply engrained domination of the patriarchy in
women's individuallives;71 at the same time a transformative
view of the polity is possible from perspectives and values
held by those in society who do not share the values of the dominant class. 72
We should not abandon the idea of autonomy because it
bound up with contradictions of liberal legalism. For the
experience of autonomy can cut both ways. When we describe
the world we envision, surely we seek the experience of autonomy for everyone; it is a goal which recognizes some true values of humanity, particularly, the honesty of subjective
self-knowledge and the power of self-determination. Feminists
have proposed a "reconceived" autonomy73 based on feminist
principles, a reconception which promotes self-determination.
Nor need we abandon the aspects of feminist thought which
envision the place of the truly autonomous person in a community or legal system reflecting progressive, transformative
values. The centrality of law in our society as the dominant
public discourse 74 provides a platform for the integration offeminist thought into a redefinition of community.
As others have argued, maybe the problem is that liberalism has not lived up to its full potentia1. 76 But for Catharine
MacKinnon, along with other critical legal theorists, liberal
legalism legitimates and perpetuates the existing order and
domination. She is not led to advocate for a theory of individual
autonomy since she views the collective class of women as the
basic referent:
70. MINOW, supra note 22, at 146-56; Rhode, supra note 25, at 633.
71. See generally GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986).
72. This is the main point of "outsider" jurisprudence, which includes feminism
and critical race theory. See Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple
Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPTR. 7 (1989).
73. Nedelsky, supra note 65.
74. Martha Fineman describes the relationship of feminist method to the dominant legal discourse in Fineman, supra note 12, at 25-34.
75. See Sarah E. Burns, Notes from the Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, 13
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1990).
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Liberal feminism takes the individual as
the proper unit of analysis and measure of
the destructiveness of sexism. For radical
feminism, although the person is kept in
view, the touchstone for analysis and outrage
is the collective "group called women"
.... [L]iberal feminism aggregates all women
out of each woman. Radical feminism sees
all women in each one .... The relationship
between the individual and the social delineates a split between liberal and radical
feminism in their view of the personal. In
liberal feminism, the personal is distinguished from the collective; in radical feminism, it comprises it.76
MacKinnon does not believe that an individual woman can
overcome the position she is allocated in the hierarchy; she
denies any transformative sense of autonomy. Kathryn Abrams
points out that MacKinnon's stance has the power to distance
and alienate women (and others) who still ascribe to a generally liberal explanation of the state and desire to exercise
choice in the conduct of their lives. 77 She criticizes the reliance
on ideological argument because it might deter social change,
but sees this, perhaps, as MacKinnon's differing strategy for
remediation. 78
Autonomy should be about empowerment, self-determination, following an inner direction, freedom.79 Focusing on
autonomy as a political, philosophical, and even psychological
construct, the autonomous individual must discover an
"authentic self." MacKinnon, in contrast, sees a victim, defined
by men, socially constructed, and either denying the reality of
her subordination or having false consciousness about the
extent of her victimization. MacKinnon's argument, fortunately, hasn't dissuaded other feminist theorists from conceptualizing a truly autonomous woman who can transcend the
problems posed by the liberal framework.
76. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at 40.
77. Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761 (1990).
But see Schroeder, supra note 33, at 194, n.269, arguing that MacKinnon may view
lack of autonomy as the root of injustice.
78. Id. at 779.
79. For the classical liberal concept of autonomy, note the discussion in JOSEPH
RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, Chapters 14-15 (1986); Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy
and Perfectionism in Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1098 (1989).
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I want to contrast MacKinnon's argument with that of
Jennifer Nedelsky who proposes a feminist concept of autonomy different from the traditional liberal definition. Her definition of autonomy is freedom and capability: "a human
capacity for making one's own life and self."80 But she sees
women's experience as providing a grounding in reality: "the
centrality of relationships in constituting the self."81 This contrasts with the liberal definition of autonomy which concerns
itself with boundaries and with rights to guarantee individual freedom. 82
Nedelskyexpands her definition of autonomy: "its essential elements are "the (problematic) notion of self-determination ... comprehension, confidence, dignity, efficacy, respect and
some degree of peace and security from oppressive power. "83 In
addition to the capacity for autonomy, she acknowledges the
importance of comprehending the subjective experience of
feeling autonomous. Liberal political theory attempts to separate the private and public spheres; it is in the private sphere
that freedom from collective action is celebrated. Critics of the
liberal tradition have demonstrated the incoherence of the
public/private distinction and Nedelsky tries to develop a
vision of autonomy that is not about boundaries but about
what she calls integration with the collective. "The task is to
make the interdependence of citizen and state conducive to,
rather than destructive of, autonomy. "84 In the latter part of
her argument, Nedelsky illustrates this interdependence by
positing, for example, the use of procedural due process to
empower citizens to change from helpless, dependent victims
of state policy into those with a sense of "dignity, competence
and power. "85
MacKinnon, on the other hand, sees the lack of choice or
autonomy for individual women as an aspect of their collective
oppression as a group. She defines rights in the negative as a
boundary protection to freedom of individual action and says
"no amount of negative freedom legally guaranteed to the
[oppressed] group will make it the equal of the first [groUp]."86
She sees women as objects, fundamentally disempowered and
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Nedelsky, supra note 65, at 8.
1d. at 9.
See the discussion in Rhode, supra note 25, at 632-35.
Nedelsky, supra note 65, at 11.
1d. at 14.
1d. at 27.
MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at 164.
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incapable of true autonomy because they have been socially
constructed by the dominant class of men. "Women cope with
objectification by trying to meet the male standard, and measure their self-worth by the degree to which they succeed."87
Autonomy, for MacKinnon, is not a virtue. It privileges individual women, contributing to their false consciousness of
oppression and forcing them to emulate the male norm, depriving the collective class of women of the knowledge and power
to move for structural change. 88
It is not clear to me why this need necessarily be SO.89
Critical legal studies theorists join with radical feminists to construct the following syllogism: individualism maximizes the
selfish, atomistic goals of (male normed) beings, leads to a
concern for rights which protect the privileges gained against
the state or the claims of others within the community and
defeats collective movement for social change. 9o Some see
rights as alienating in themselves, creating a situation where
there is no possibility of true community.9! To me, there is an
alternative vision. The goal is true (political, social, economic) autonomy for each person, regardless of gender, race or
class. A redefined community consists of those auto- nomous,
authentic selves who aspire to this vision. To use a rights analysis to protect and encourage the development of autonomy
need not result in a static, conservative, protectionist world.
Pluralist strains in liberal society, rather than standing only
for the state's neutrality toward the pursuit of individual
ends, can result in an accomodation of the many, energetic
visions for the future, a true non-essentialism."

I next want to discuss how the concept of autonomy can be
reformulated by feminists without buying into the negatives
of liberal legalism. I suggest that a true concept of feminism
which strives for the creation of an "authentic" self will not only
supply a building block for feminist legal theory but will be the
basis of a relational theory of authentic selves within a strong
community. If feminism has transformative goals, recreating
self-determination will inevitably result in women sharing
their experience of autonomy.
87. [d. at 149.
88. [d. at 124.

89. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 33, at 193·96.
90. See the discussion in MINOW, supra note 22, at 164·72.
91. Gabel, supra note 68.
92. See Carol Weisbrod, Practical Polyphony: Theories of the State and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 985 (1990).
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Feminist methodology can redefine the arguments for
autonomy: first, autonomy has intrinsic value both in recognizing the subjectivity of individual experience and the importance of agency. Second, rights analysis should not be totally
dismissed as it may provide important protection for the subordinate group as it struggles to assert its identity. And,
finally, claims of ideological determinism by radical feminists
such as MacKinnon are counterproductive to her own goal of
freedom from domination since they interfere with the development of autonomy. I do not simply adopt a defense of liberal political theory; my idea of autonomy is grounded in the
transformative lessons of feminism.

B.

THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF AUTONOMY

First, autonomy is ultimately the capacity of a person to
choose freely the direction of her life. 93 As ail aspect of liberal
theory, it has intrinsic value in the concept of liberty, though
it has been distinguished from freedom in that it implies an
aspect of inner direction, not merely the absence of constraint
on choice of activity. 94
For an individual to develop an inner direction, she must
be in touch with her 'authentic self.J95 The authentic self is the
subjective experience, truly understood. It is here that feminist methodology can help construct (reconstruct?) subjectivity, through the experience of consciousness-raising, context
and narrative. 96 Robin West says:
As we become more aware of the presence of
patriarchal power, we become more aware of
93. RAz, supra note 79, at Chapter 14.
94. Waldron, supra note 79, at 1103-08.
95. The notion of an "authentic self" appears frequently in feminist theory,
defined in different ways. Ruth Colker sees it as "some intuitive sense of each of our
human possibilities." Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary
Inquiry into the Politics ofAuthenticity, 68 B.U.L. REV. 217, 221 (1988). She recognizes
that feminist theory, particularly that of MacKinnon, tends to focus on externalities
"rather than internal changes in consciousness." Id. at 218. Gloria Steinem focuses
on the development of self esteem in individual women as essential to the success of
a feminist movement. GLORIA STEINEM, REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN (1992).
However, for Nancy Chodorow, whose feminist writings center upon the selfs
development ofindividuality through its connection to the mother, it is explicitly linked
to psychoanalytic insight of object-relations theory "[ whichl conceptualizes the self as
inexorably social and intrinsciaUy connected." NANCY J. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND
PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 158-59 (1989).
96. See, e.g., Christine Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method
Makes (Book Review), 41 STAN. L. REV. 751, 782-84 (1989) ("[Tlhe experience of
shared experience ... is what constructs women as an oppositional class").
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that which is within us-whether or not we
decide to call it a "self'-and of that which
is vulnerable to patriarchy's terrible destructivity.... Through consciousness-raising,
women come to reclaim a self that is within .... The critical female self knows herself as
a fantastic, unlived, unspeakable, unspoken alternative which cannot render itself
more concrete, and which is known in large
part through its absence from cultured life. 97
Because West believes that it is primarily a lack of self
which is reinforced by existing social constructs, she rejects criticallegal theory's regeneration of an unalienated self. West
draws on MacKinnon's idea of the "giving self' (who may give
to avoid male violence), Chodorow's idea of "connectedness"
through a girl's identification with her mother and her own theory of the centrality of reproduction in women's lives to construct a feminist self-identity.98 It is her attempt to define the
inner direction that shapes women's lives that helps to create
a respect for autonomy different from that of classical liberal
thought.
1.

Subjectivity

Feminism's rallying cry of the "personal is the political" is
central to its focus on the discussion of shared experience.
Ironically, when feminists attempt to advance the discussion
toward personal growth, they are dismissed and marginalized as fixating on personal issues. 99 However, relation of
subjective experience through consciousness raising or narrative or other group methods, can contribute to a political
definition of autonomy.
Ann Freedman explicitly links "serious work on personal
issues as part of(and not a substitute for) collective efforts to
make change."loo She attributes, for example, her failure to
renounce discriminatory tenure and appointments problems at
her law school to the "lifetime in a sexist culture in which my
97. Robin West. Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL

F. 59, 88.
98. [d.
99. See. e.g., STEINEM, supra note 95.
100. Ann E. Freedman. Feminist Legal Method in Action: Challenging Racism.
Sexism and Homophobia in Law School. 24 GA. L. REV. 849, 853-58 (1990) (describing her personal experience with internalized sexism and a program for change).
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self esteem and sense of entitlement have been continually
undermined." To recover a sense of empowerment, she notes
that "the false equation of self-love with greed and selfishness
must be challenged."lol (MacKinnon, on the other hand, says
"Since when is politics therapy?"103) Freedman's story shows
that even the privileged among us experience powerlessness from sexism in ways that seriously interfere with our
autonomy.
To the extent that autonomy focuses on the subjective
experience of the individual it values the inner direction and
sense of the person. And, paired with the feminist methodology of consciousness raising, reflections on subjective experience help to define and delineate collective notions of
realization and empowerment. 103 Since the effect of sexist or
patriarchical experience in our culture is to demean, marginalize and subordinate women, it seems necessary to undo that
damage, to rekindle the individual sense of self-worth before
undertaking the dismantling of the cultural constructs. It is
difficult to see how the collective experience can fuel movement
toward change without attainment of autonomy for individual women. In response to MacKinnon, work in therapy can certainly affect individuals, but an effective collective strategy for
raising and articulating individual experiences of marginalization will contribute toward growth and true autonomy.104
2.

Agency

Agency, by which I mean self-determination, is another
aspect of autonomy to be valued intrinsically. However,
women's capacity for self-determination is hindered by the
experience of gender. First, women as a group lack equal
access to the economic conditions which will support autonomy.IOG As Pat Cain puts it, "[T]he goal of feminism is to achieve
sufficient changes in the material conditions of women's lives
so they can create themselves as freely and authentically as
men. "108 There must be a minimum fulfillment of basic needs
before the capacity for autonomy can be exercised. 107 Women are
101. 1d. at 857.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 40, at 220.
Littleton, supra note 96.
Freedman, supra note 100.
Williams, supra note 33.
Cain, The Limits of Equality, supra note 25, at 826.
RAz, supra note 79, at 373-76; Waldron. supra note 79. at 1108-09.
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economically disadvantaged through divorce, single parenthood, pregnancy, pay disparity, promotion and because of their
obligations to the families and have trouble supporting the
capacity for autonomy.
Second, Kathryn Abrams supports the feminist argument
for agency from the perspective of women as rational decision makers. She articulates the importance of women having
the true capacity for free choice and fears that ideological
determinism, such as MacKinnon's dominance theory, will
encourage scrutiny of women's personal choices and detract
from women's ability to make meaningful individual decisions. In the areas of choice within the abortion decision and
the decision to leave the workplace during parenting, she
notes that women labor under a stereotype of doubts about their
capacity for making meaningful choices and that these doubts
have "fueled the opposition to women's equality. "108
C.

THE CONTINUING UTILITY OF RIGHTS ANALYSIS

In contrast to critical legal scholars, feminist theorists
find liberal rights analysis useful in ways which impact upon
the connection of the individual to the community. Whereas liberal theory protects the individual through legal rights, feminist theory transforms rights discourse to account for the
individual woman's perspective, which then affects the definition of the right and its consequences for the collectivity.
Patricia Williams, for example, comments in the context of
African-American rights: "Although rights may not be ends in
themselves, rights rhetoric has been and continues to be an
effective form of discourse for blacks. The vocabulary of rights
speaks to an establishment that values the guise of stability,
and from whom social change for the better must come (whether
it is given, taken, or smuggled). "109 "[T]he goal is to find a
political mechanism that can confront the denial of need."110
"The task .. .is not to discard rights but to see through or past
them so that they reflect a larger definition of privacy and property: so that privacy is turned from exclusion based on self
regard into regard for another's fragile, mysterious autonomy;
108. Abrams, supra note 77, at 779-83. See also Williams, supra note 33.
109. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALcHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 149 (1989). Compare
the discussion in Williams with CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAw, 14459 (1987); MINOW, supra note 22, at Chapter 6; Rhode, supra note 25,at 632-35.
110. Williams, supra note 109, at 152.
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and so that property regains its ancient connotation of being
a reflection of the universal self. "111
Williams exquisitely balances the problems of the real
world in which she feels dis empowered and her vision of the
world to work for: where "society must give [rights] away... Give
to all of society's objects and untouchables the rights of privacy,
integrity and self assertion; give them distance and respect.
Flood them with the animating spirit that rights mythology
fires in this country's most oppressed psyches, and wash away
the shrouds of inanimate-object status, so that we may say not
that we own gold but that a luminous golden spirit owns us. "112
Elizabeth Schneider proposes a resolution to the rights problem: that it be used to establish a dialogue to bridge theory
and practice. us Her recognition of the reality of legal practice
demonstrates the transformative potential of rights which are
utilized, not merely to enforce the status quo, but to define
areas of protection for the oppressed. Schneider argues for an
Hegelian interaction in which the politics of the collective movement is energized and enhanced by the necessity of developing
legal theories of rights: "The articulation of women's rights provides a sense of self and distinction for individual women, while
at the same time giving women an important sense of collective
identity.... they also actively shape public discourse."114 While
recognizing criticism from the feminist critical theorists that
rights convert real political goals into abstract, neutral claims,
Schneider argues that "these claims, articulated in the language of rights, have advanced the political development and
organizing potential of the movement, and expanded and concretized the consciousness of feminist activists and litigators."115
Schneider examines conflicts among feminists regarding
legal rights solutions to items on the feminist agenda: reproductive freedom, pregnancy leave, pornography, sexual harassment and battering. She argues that articulation of legal
theories of rights, in each case, "illuminated broader political
perceptions of patriarchy and sexual subordination"116 and, in
effect, started the conversation within and without the legal
forum for political change.
lll.
ll2.
ll3.
ll4.
ll5.
ll6.

ld. at 164.
ld. at 165.
Schneider, supra note 65.
ld. at 625.
ld. at 640.
ld. at 650.
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Schneider sees rights analysis as benefiting both individual women and women as a class because of the potential for
political transformation. She does acknowledge the perception
that "an equal rights perspective only affords individual women
access to treatment as males," but she believes "the source of
the claims, women's experience, modifie[s] the substance of the
claims themselves."117 She argues for an ongoing dialectic in
which both the creative aspects of rights claims and a critical
stance toward rights contribute to political strategy for the
movement as a whole. u8
A different problem in relying on rights analysis through
definition of abstract legal rights is presented by those who critique an essentialist feminism. While the critical theorists see
rights as indeterminate, capable of manipulation by the legal
establishment, and therefore both unhelpful in securing true
equality and contributing to continued reliance on an illegitimate system, the critique from the anti-essentialist perspective sees the difficulty in arriving at anyone clear articulation
of a legal right to secure advantages for all women.
A response to this critique is to encourage a multiplicity of
perspectives from which to engage in rights discourse. A different perspective views rights, not as abstract notions of
legal entitlement, but as 'practices'. Adelaide Villmoare proposes listening carefully to women, not just lawyers, who, in the
context of their daily experience, rely on rights discourse, creating the potential for "articulating liberatory visions or more
immediate political and social alternatives. "U9 Villmoare characterizes these critical perspectives as a postmodern approach:
"[they] respect the partiality of interpretation and develop
understandings of phenomena as practices within local contexts. And they seek out multiplicities of experiences where differences and distinctions assume notable significance. "120 She
proposes a focus on the context of women's actual experience
to define what rights women claim and argues that this method
helps constitute women's self-identity.121 Anti-essentialist feminism and postmodernism both accept the multiplicity of
women's experience; reliance on rights analysis in the context
117. Id. at 639-42.
118. Id. at 640.
119. Adelaide H. Villmoare, Women, Differences and Rights as Practices: An
Interpretive Essay and a Proposal, 25 LAW & SOC'y REV. 385, 392 (1991).
120. Id. at 400.
121. Id. at 402-03.
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of differences among women helps to construct, not a universal, abstract theory of rights, but a link between individual
women's experience and feminist "law, politics and research. "122
Rights analysis in feminist legal thought reflects the richness
of these arguments. First, there is the recognition that rights
are not a luxury for those oppressed by a dominant legal system.
Then, the notion that the articulation oflegal rights fuels ideas
about political movements. Finally, insistence on the integration of women's experience or practice to understand the derivation of rights resists the universality of abstract legal claims.
D.

FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS, COLLABORATION AND DENIAL

My final argument for autonomy stems from my discomfort
with the structural argument that claims women are so dominated by the gender construct that they cannot make free
choices about the path of their lives. The primary proponent
of the argument is MacKinnon,123 but Robin West also agrees. 124
Kathryn Abrams terms this "ideological determinism" and
suggests that it might show an ultimate disrespect for individual women and a devaluation of their own experience. 126
MacKinnon and West both understand gender as a social construction and argue that there is no self apart from that which
is socially determined. MacKinnon, for example, believes that
women, collectively oppressed under male domination, cannot
freely choose their lives, even if they say their choices are freely
made. 126 She borrows from Marxist analysis to claim that women
experience false consciousness if they do not understand the full
implications of the reasons for their lack of true autonomy.
MacKinnon has been criticized by other feminist writers for
this position. 127 Ironically, her prescription for change, to the
extent that she offers one, involves consciousness raising,128 a
way of exploring the destructive effects of oppression by men
through the sharing of women's experience. While consciousness raising can have political impact, it also is a means of selfrealization, a path toward individual choice and autonomy.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 406.
MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at 103.
West, supra note 97.
Abrams, supra note 77, at 774·75.
MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at 124.
SMART, supra note 109, at 77·81; Weisbrod, supra note 92, at 993 n.38.
MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at Chapter 5.
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Joan Williams reports a slightly different story: that of
the internalization by women of social norms created by men. 129
Ultimately, this results in what Robin West calls denial of
women's true selves. 13o
West feels women "distinctively bear the mark of patriarchal power by denying rather than acting upon ... their pleasures
and internalizing and identifying with rather than avoiding
their pains .. .if patriarchy has affirmatively created a social
existence for women, it is one of objecthood, or otherhood, but
most assuredly not selfhood. "131
These arguments about false consciousness and denial
portray women as incapable of an autonomy of self. They are
seen as passive victims of male domination so pervasively
embedded in the culture that women are not aware of its
effects, and, in fact, have internalized patriarchy's agenda. As
Abrams notes, these claims can be counterproductive to both
the falsely conscious victim and others in society listening to
the claim. 132 The problem is that acceptance of this view denies
even the existence of a capacity to create a feminist explanation for theory. 133
MacKinnon's account goes further. In defending her proposed ordinance remediating victims of pornography against
attacks by liberal feminist lawyers on privacy and first amendment grounds, MacKinnon calls them "collaborators." She
argues that:
[W]e were let into this profession on the
implicit condition that we would enforce the
real rules: women kept out and down,
sexual access to women enforced. These
remain the rules whether you are in and
up, and whether you practice it or have it
practiced on you. It keeps the value of the
most exceptional women high to keep other
women out and down and on their backs
with their legs spread ... What law school
does for you is this: it tells you that to
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Williams, Bupra note 33.
West, Bupra note 97, at 87·89.
[d. at 88.
Abrams, Bupra note 77.
Weisbrod, Bupra note 92.
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become a lawyer means to forget your feelings, forget your community, most of all, if
you are a woman, forget your experience. 1M
Abrams discusses the reasons why MacKinnon's 'categorical
discourse' may need to use the polemical form as a political
strategy.l36 I fear that MacKinnon's image of women lawyers is
as exaggerated as it is powerful. Because it is demeaning to all
women, it is a strange way to build a political movement or to
encourage women to join the battle. It reduces all women to the
centrality of their sexuality (MacKinnon's main point) and
their complicity with male domination if they fail to support her
program.
And, of course, it suggests that they are not truly autonomous,
capable of supporting or refusing to support an issue on principled grounds, further marginalizing their views. The centrality
of women's sexual use and abuse by men as the key description
of gender domination may obscure potential development of
other issues in feminist thought. Yet what seems so wrong about
MacKinnon's argument is its lack of respect for the self-determination and autonomy of those she addresses.
Autonomy can be a transformative concept, as Nedlesky
points out. 136 While the classic liberal concept of the individual does not seem full enough to account for women's differing
vision for a society,137 the core values of autonomy (subjectivity, agency, self- determination) seem necessary for creation of
freedom from subordination. If feminism is serious about
women's relation of their subjective experience through narrative and contextual analysis, it must get equally serious
about confronting and affirming the development of a transformative concept of autonomy.
II.

COMMUNITY IN FEMINIST THOUGHT

Liberal legal thought attempts to counter the critique of
selfish individualism by situating the self in a community of
134. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, Bupra note 40, at 205.
135. Abrams, Bupra note 77, at 770-74. Angela Harris used the term categorical
discourse in reviewing MacKinnon's work to describe argument which is, ultimately,
reductionist. Angela Harris, Categorical DiBcourBe and Dominance Theory (Book
Review), 5 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 181 (1990).
136. Nedelsky, supra note 65.
137. But see Susan Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice,
in FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY (Cass R. Sunstein, ed., 1990) for the argument that
JOHN RAWLS' A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972) is consistent with a feminist vision.
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interests. Michael Sandel, a proponent of this view, argues that
our "constitutive self-understandings comprehend a wider
subject than the individual alone ... [with] a common vocabulary
of discourse and a background of implicit practices and understandings within which the opacity of the participants is
reduced if never finally dissolved. »I38 While Sandel envisions
the melting of the "otherness" of the individual, the cultural
feminists see a stark opposition by relating the dichotomy of
individual/community to that of male/female. 139
As Iris Marion Young describes liberal thought: "The culture identifies masculinity with the values associated with individualism - self-sufficiency, competition, separation, the formal
equality of rights. The culture identifies femininity, on the
other hand, with community - affective relations of care, mutual aid and cooperation. "140 Women are seen as nurturant, giving beings, drawn naturally to communities to express their
ethic of care. 141 For example, Robin West describes a woman's
use of her power over an infant as emphatically not one ofhierarchy or domination but one of care. She argues that women
can therefore imagine a different, non-hegemonic way of rei ating. 142 Annette Baier, focusing on the development of trust
between human beings, similarly postulates a theory of feminist morality directly opposite to the [male] arms-length contractarian model, one which allows for inequality of power
and a natural connection to others.143
The ethic of care set out by Carol Gilligan is often cited as
an example of women's distinctly different approach toward
communitarian models. Yet there has been surprisingly little
development of exactly what a community defined by a feminist vision would look like. One of the reasons, I suspect, is that
it is difficult to generalize about a homogeneity of interests
without tripping the anti-essentialist critique. If there is no
essential constitution of Woman, the content of the community's values is unclear. And the critique has been power138. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 147·53 (1982).
Michael J. Sandel, Justice and the Good, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael
Sandel ed., 1984).
139. Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference,
in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 21, at 300.
140: Id. at 306. .

141. Id.
142. West, supra note 97, at 80.
143. Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, in FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra
note 137, at 279.
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ful. The cultural feminists are left describing a vision of cooperation which is so general as to be meaningless.
For example, Wendy Kaminer argues that concern for community is basic to feminism. It is "a belief that what women
share is character-the capacity to 'care' and compromise and
make peace . . . they share a past-of economic powerlessness, dependence and vulnerability to sexual abuse, of child
rearing, homemaking and community service. The irony for
feminists is that the separate women's world created by discrimination and traditional divisions of labor have always
been a source of strength for women as well as a fount offrustration. "144 But these generalizations are not necessarily universal nor do they lead to a positive concept of community.
Marilyn Friedman explores the limits of the 'social self,'
which both contributes to self-identity and gives meaning to
individual lives. 146 She finds this self engaged in a redefinition
of community, one based on the ethics of care. Yet she cautions
that a community premised on family, religion or neighborhood
can be constraining because it imposes moral claims upon its
members. As she points out, many communities (churches, for
instance) have a long history of gender domination and oppression which impact on women, doubly so if women honor the
moral claims made. 146 Friedman ends up proposing freely chosen communities, rather than ones in which the self and identity are embedded. The example she gives is of the city, where
women can be free from the gender roles imposed on them by
their families, neighborhoods, and religious institutions. 147
Her pre~cription for a feminist version of community ends up
looking much like the vision of autonomy proposed above.
In her critique of individualism, Fox-Genovese argues for
using "the proud vocabulary of shared pain" between men and
women as a basis for confronting a commitment to social justice, rather than looking toward women's subjective experience,
which is one of oppression. 146 "Above all, we are groping toward
144. WENDY KAMINER, A FEARFUL FREEDOM: WOMEN'S FLIGHT FROM EQUALITY
(1990).
145. Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship, in FEMINISM AND
POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 137, at 143.
146. [d. at 147.
147. [d. at 155.
148. FOX-GENoVESE, supra note 2, at 240, 234. Her critique of individualism in
the feminist movement is premised on a return to community.
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an understanding of all individuals as hostage to the collectivities to which they belong and which alone give their identities meaning."149 Fox-Genovese argues that adherence to
individualism has ended up disadvantaging women who had
previously been cared for by social institutions, such as marriage, leaving them with the cruel idea of individualism but no
valid support.160 "Feminism, as the daughter of women's exclusion, understands that social opportunity must lie in access to
the various roles that society offers."161 She concludes that
reconceiving the nature of community is crucial. Because "difference lies at the core of our humanity," gender relations
must be subject to constant reinterpretation for society to
understand the consequences of difference. 162
The idea that the concept of community is a "set of shared
understandings located in the self'163 also tends to dissolve the
dichotomy of individual/community, "thus generat[ing] a dialectic in which each is a condition for the other. "164 The dissolution of the dichotomy of individual/community is the
postmodern ideal. Nedelsky expresses a related idea when
she sees autonomy as dependent on links to the community for
its definition; that autonomy is enhanced by interaction with
the community rather than by respect for boundaries, creating the potential for both freer individuals and a stronger,
more integrated community.166
But if the idea of community is premised on shared understandings or values, the danger is that the community will need
to be homogeneous to reach agreement. As the criteria to
find agreement are narrowed, the group thus constituted will
exclude more than it will include. While this coming together
to reinforce identity is a powerful alternative to alienation in
the society as a whole, it validates exclusion as a principle and
draws attention away from common ground between groupS.166
149. [d. at 240. Although she acknowledges Friedman's argument that communities have historically oppressed women, she persists in her critique of feminist theory which seeks to free women from their related institutions. In this way, she and
Friedman are at opposite poles.
150. [d. at Chapter 2.
151. [d. at 241.
152. [d. at 238.
153. Steven Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 963, 1002 (1991).
154. Young, supra note 139, at 307.
155. Nedelsky, supra note 65.
156. See Ilene Philipson, What's the Big J.D.? The Politics of the Authentic Self,
TIKKUN, Nov.lDec. 1991, at 51.
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Worse, to the extent that the 'authentic self' is defined by
identification with the group, the process of Balkanization
may also result in the shattering of the self.167 Young argues
that a post-modern sensibility would, instead, recognize and
accept difference and reject exclusion on the grounds of homogeneity.168
It is in the post-modern position exemplified by Young that
we begin to see the contingency of the individual within the
community. The post-modern position rejects anyone clear definition of community in favor of a "transformative program"
comprised of "healthy debate, respectful disagreement, and continual reappraisal. "169 Process once again transcends any unitary vision of a just society. Feminist thought has contributed
much to this dialectic by insisting on the primacy of the subjective experience of women and by developing the critique of
liberalism through the recognition of difference.

We now need to redefine both autonomy (to create strong
authentic selves) and community (to establish a freely chosen,
shared construct). It is the project for the next stage of feminist legal thought.
III.

AFTERWORD

This essay presents an argument for autonomy that is
transformative. I conclude that it is much easier to construct
a theory of autonomy than to describe a feminist vision of
community which does not sound superficial or oppressive. I am
convinced that feminist thought and the process of shared
experience are dynamically situated to propose alternatives as
the opacity between individual and community dissolves.
But I share Martha Fineman's concern that feminist legal
thought "seems unanchored." Or more particularly, it seems
anchored in many different directions: "[i]t drifts between the
extremes of 'grand theory,' which is totalizing in its scope and
ambitions, and personal narratives, which begin and end with
the presentation of one individual's unique experience. "160
With the failure of grand theory to capture the spirit of the
157. Id. at 55.
158. Young, supra note 139, at 312.
159. Allan C. Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (1s There Politics After
Postmodernism7) (Book Review), 89 MICH. L. REV. 1549,61 (1991).
160. Fineman, supra note 12, at 25.
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movement and the attack on essentialism which deterred the
exploration of common ground among women in favor of presentation of differences, she argues that "[t]his disunity
impedes the aggregation of power necessary for women of all
groups to push back the barriers exluding most of us and our
experiences. "161
My own support for a reconceived autonomy stems from the
sense I have about the level of energy needed to push back the
barriers. That energy needs to be grounded both in a solid
sense of judgment about ultimate social values and strong
self identity. In fact, the very questions that are impacted at
the juncture of autonomy and community.

161. Id. at 40.
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